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I 
Sartre failed to publish a finished ethical treat-
ise during his lifetime, 1 in spite of the fact that he 
filled hundreds of manuscript pages in at least two at-
tempts at a projected Morale.* This failure on his 
part to produce a systematic moral theory has occa-
sioned a great deal of confusion as regards the struc-
ture and even the possibility of a Sartrean ethic. The 
prevailing sentiment is that the ontology of Being and 
Nothingness effectively precludes the possibility of a 
consistent ethic. 
This rejection of the possibility of a Sartrean 
ethic, I would suggest, is unwarranted from both a tex-
tual and a philosophical perspective. To be sure, 
Sartre never did publish a treatise devoted exclusively 
to ethics; nevertheless, it can hardly be denied that 
the overall tenor of his work is moralistic—and, ac-
cording to some commentators, even puritanical. 3 In 
addition to this general moralistic attitude, the 
Sartrean corpus lends itself to the enterprise of 
discovering just what the parameters of Sartre's ethic 
would have been had he in fact completed one. Sartre's 
oeuvres are full of references, explicit or otherwise, 
to the foundation and structure of such an ethic, 
ready-to-hand for anyone with the patience (or freedom 
from bias) to search them out. At least three commen-
tators have done so, in fact, each producing lucid and 
consistent accounts of a Sartrean ethic* 
The primary reason for the ubiquitous but mistaken 
opinion that a Sartrean ethic is impossible lies, I 
suspect, in a misreading of Being and Nothingness. All 
too often, commentators have taken passages in that 
treatise which are phenomenological analyses of bad 
faith to be representations of necessary human rela-
tions. An inevitability is read into such demoralizing 
descriptions as Sartre's infamous characterization of 
love as sado-masochism,* and it is assumed that it and 
other equally dreary portrayals of intersubjectivity in 
Being and Nothingness as necessary entailments. Such, 
however, is not the case. Sartre makes it clear in 
Being and Nothingness' that his analysis of human rela-
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tions is to be interpreted as a description of bad 
faith (which I shall discuss more fully later), of the 
nonmoral act, and not as a final statement about an ir-
remediable human nature or condition. 7 Read in this 
light. Being and Nothingness not only does not preclude 
the possibility of a Sartrean ethic, it actually points 
in its direction. All the elements of an ethical 
theory are contained in germinal form within it, and 
when they are considered in conjunction with both 
Sartre's other writings and the secondary literature 
which concerns itself with an existentialist ethic, 
they provide us with a fairly cohesive picture of what 
the moral life is for Sartre. 
The ethical theory which reveals itself from 
Sartre's and his associates' writings rests upon the 
possibility of what is called the "radical conversion," 
a readjustment of the individual's fundamental project 
so intensive that it changes her entire way of being-
in-the-world. Behaviour which is chronologically prior 
to this conversion is, at best, pre-ethical; behaviour 
after the conversion, assuming that the conversion is 
continually and freely reaffirmed by the individual, is 
ethical. 
Fundamental as the radical conversion is for the 
possibility of a Sartrean ethic, it is not the primal 
requirement. The conversion itself is dependent upon a 
condition which is both logically and chronologically 
prior to it, namely the achievement within the subject 
of what Sartre calls "pure reflection." As such, pure 
reflection is the necessary condition for the possibil-
ity of a Sartrean ethic. The progression is not an 
inevitable one, in the sense that anyone who acquires 
pure reflection will automatically undergo a conver-
sion, nor even that anyone who undergoes the conversion 
will sustain it in her future actions. There are no 
guarantees in a Sartrean ethic. But there is a logical 
necessity to the progression, in that no one can enter 
into the realm of the ethical without the conversion, 
which in turn is not itself reached save through pure 
reflection. 
In the discussion that follows, my purpose is to 
schematize the "stages on life's way" through which the 
individual for-itself travels in its journey to pure 
reflection and possible conversion. These stages, in 
logical order, may be represented as "immediacy," 
"impure reflection," and "pure reflection." As will be 
seen, the achievement of pure reflection can to a cer-
tain extent be viewed as a "recovery of innocence" 
inasmuch as it places the for-itself in a mode of con-
sciousness remarkably similar to original pre-reflec-
tive immediacy. Or, even better, we might characterize 
the dynamics of radical conversion as a process of 
Aufhebung, in which prior stages are surpassed only to 
be incorporated into the terminus point. 
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To be sure, Sartre himself never explicitly schema-
tized the dialectic at work in the individual for-
itself's achievement of pure reflection and conversion. 
Furthermore, none of the secondary literature (to my 
knowledge) undertakes an analysis of the actual dynam-
ics of the radical conversion, except insofar as to 
compare pre-conversion reflection with post-conversion 
reflection. I freely admit, therefore, that most of my 
paradigm is based upon extrapolation from and extension 
of Sartre's writings. I trust, however, that my devel-
opmental schematization of Sartre's sometimes elusive 
references to pure reflection, far from taking unwar-
ranted liberties with his text, will serve to clarify 
both the major project of Being and Nothingness— 
namely, the description of pre-conversion behaviour— 
and the nature of a Sartrean ethic. 
II 
Immediacy 
Immediacy, or "unreflective consciousness,"' is 
both logically and chronologically the original con-
sciousness of the for-itself. It represents an ante-
predicative stage of innocence, as it were, the sponta-
neous flow of consciousness as freedom which is sullied 
by neither thetic awareness of self nor by the realiza-
tion of its historicity--a knowledge which, as we shall 
see, is eventually translated into "psychic," objecti-
fied terms by impure reflection. One could almost 
describe immediacy as an animal-like lived intuition, 
were it not for the fact that human immediacy is at 
least tacitly aware of its origin, a relation not at 
all certain in animal consciousness. Sartre stresses 
that even immediate consciousness is nonthetically 
aware of itself as source,' that there is a pre-
reflective cogito implied in every act of immediate 
consciousness, and that this tacit awareness is so 
ubiquitous that it is affirmed by the subject, without 
her even being aware of the act, in her very speech 
patterns." This nonpositional awareness of self must 
not be confused with an explicit knowledge, however; at 
the level of immediacy, consciousness is free of the 
presence-to-self which reflection brings. It is a nat-
ural (nonreflective) flow of freedom, with neither mo-
tivation nor goal. 
Immediacy, of course, is not simply the original 
(in the chronological sense) state of a consciousness 
experiencing its being-in-the-world. Although the ori-
ginal innocence of immediacy is impossible to sustain 
(at least in normal humans), immediate moments of con-
sciousness are part and parcel of our entire careers as 
sentient beings. Whenever one loses oneself in the 
moment of aesthetic or religious contemplation, 
whenever one luxurates in the sheer pleasure of the 
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moment, with no thought whatsoever of temporality, or 
even when one engages in rather mechanical tasks which 
freeze consciousness for the duration of their perform-
ance, immediacy reappears. Immediacy as pure ex-
perience is lived, is "existed," as often or as seldom 
as we reflective beings lose our presence-to-self. 
Impure Reflection 
The sudden eruption of immediacy into reflection 
is, Sartre tells us, a "mystification". 1 1 We can say 
what happens after the transition is made, and we can 
even give a general account of the motivation that 
triggers the transition. But it is difficult to fully 
explain how it is that the motivation arises in the 
first place. What can be said about the process, how-
ever, is that the for-itself, by virtue of its constant 
contact with objects-in-the-world, cannot sustain the 
original attitude of immediacy indefinitely. Sooner or 
later, the for-itself will be seized with the insight 
that there is a difference between it and the other. 
At that point, consciousness will become aware of it-
self being aware (i.e., will be aware of itself dis-
tinguishing between itself and the other), and this 
perception will thrust it abruptly into the realm of 
the reflective. 
Regardless of its first cause, however, the reflec-
tivity that initially arises from this upsurge of self-
consciousness is usually of the impure variety. It may 
not be a logical necessity that impure reflection fol-
lows immediacy, but from an experiential point of view 
such a sequence seems more likely than one of pure re-
flection arising from immediacy. As Sartre says, "Is 
it possible to pass from immediate consciousness to 
pure reflection? I know nothing about it. Perhaps one 
can achieve it after the exercise of pure reflection, 
but I could not~say a priori that a being living on the 
level of pure immediacy is capable of pure reflection. 
What is most frequently encountered is, I believe, 
people who pass calmly from the immediate to impure 
reflection." 1 1 
What, then, is this impure reflection? Sartre 
tells us it is the "reflective consciousness of man-in-
the-world in his daily experience." 1 1 It is a lived, 
embodied reflectivity, similar in this respect to imme-
diacy, an introspection which penetrates only to a min-
imal and quite superficial level of consciousness. 
There is no explicit process of intellectual ausculta-
tion with impure reflection; it is "too busy" simply 
existing-in-the-worId to undertake a profound analysis 
of its structure. As a consequence, it bases its ac-
tions upon a fundamental project whose authenticity it 
complacently assumes, without virtue of prior examina-
tion. Sartre has an explanation for the shallowness of 
impure reflection's self-penetration, however; he in-
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sists that impure reflection refuses to sincerely exa-
mine its fundamental project because in so doing it 
would be forced to face up to the fact that the mode of 
existence called for by the project is a self-
deception. This fundamental project is, as we shall 
see, essentially self-contradictory, and as a result 
the pursuit of it propels impure reflection into a 
series of self-defeating secondary projects. In a 
word, the fundamental project of impure reflection is 
the attempt to deny and flee from the very freedom 
which defines the for-itself. 
This flight from freedom, and the complementary 
guest for being which characterizes impure reflection, 
arises from the ruins of pre-reflective immediacy. As 
the for-itself continues in its presence to being, 
Sartre tells us, it eventually begins to lose itself in 
its historicity. It cannot grasp itself as a substance 
in the flow of the fleeting, escaping present, and so 
it must increasingly look for itself in both its con-
crete past and its projected future. But this "eksta-
tic" assumption of self, far from providing conscious-
ness with a satisfactorily solid self-image, only 
serves to alienate it further. It sees itself as 
separate from itself, "dispersed" out there in the 
world of the in-itself. Instead of recognising this 
lack of self-coincidence as an essential representation 
of what it is, the for-itself views it as a remediable 
shortcoming. It fails to recognize the inevitability 
of its failures to coincide because it fails (or 
refuses) to see the nonbeing which it is." 1 
At this level, the for-itself has hypostasized it-
self as an in-itself which is outside of itself. It 
has discovered itself only to lose itself in the exter-
nal, out there "next" to the in-itself. Its next step 
will be to recover itself for itself by interiorizing 
that objective selfness which it has found projected 
into the world. The for-itself will attempt to posit 
itself as a substantial entity by making of itself an 
object-to-self. And precisely this endeavor is the 
schism of reflection. As such, "reflection remains for 
the for-itself . . . an attempt to recover being. By 
reflecting, the for-itself, which has lost itself out-
side itself, attempts to put itself inside its own 
being." 1' 
This objectification and interiorization of the 
for-itself's temporal ekstases into a substantial 
"self" is what Sartre calls the "psyche." 1' The psy-
che, as the concretization of the for-itself's temporal 
modes of existence, represents the "objectification of 
the for-itself." 1 7 The individual for-itself, as sub-
ject, is seen as an opaque cache of motives, passions 
and impulses, which "move" the subject in the same way 
that the wind moves a leaf. The for-itself assumes the 
character of a thing amidst the world of things. At 
the same time, however, the for-itself retains its in-
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teriority and its flow; it is consciousness of itself 
as a thing, and hence is capable of enjoying its sup-
posed thinghood. In short, the for-itself, in interio-
rizing its temporal ekstases as object, seeks to unify 
within itself being-in-itself and being-for-itself: 
"to be itself as an object-in-itself--that is what the 
being-of-reflection has to be." 1' This effort to be 
what is an obvious contradiction in terms is what 
Sartre calls impure reflection's fundamental project: 
the desire to be god, i.e., the desire to simultaneous-
ly be both pure substance and pure act, to be the 
source of one's own being. 1' It is the attempt on the 
part of the for-itself to escape the nothingness which 
essentially defines it, and to found itself within the 
opacity of being. As such, the god-project is the ef-
fort to deny freedom, to freeze transcendence into a 
solidified, finite length of temporality. "The goal in 
short is to overtake that being which flees itself, it-
self while being what it is in the mode of not-being, 
which escapes between its own fingers; the goal is to 
make of it a given, a given which finally is what it 
is." 1' To repeat, impure reflection, along with its 
correlate the god-project, is an "abortive effort on 
the part of the for-itself to be another while remain-
ing itself." 1 1 
The consequence of the god-project's quest for be-
ing and denial of freedom are far reaching. Being-for-
itself not only sees itself as a kind of malleable 
thing which is constituted by the objects and events it 
encounters in the world, 1 1 but also assumes that norma-
tive values are likewise "things," immutable and in-
flexible entities that exist "out there" somewhere. In 
short, the for-itselfs obvious valuation of the god-
project broadens itself into a valuation of being-in-
general. The for-itself projects the existence of con-
cretized values because it values concretizations of 
itself. This fundamental attitude is, of course, the 
well known "spirit of seriousness," or bad faith, which 
Sartre and de Beauvoir make so much of, 1' and which 
Being and Nothingness is essentially an analysis of. 
It is a denial of the ontological structure of the for-
itself. 
As such, this project towards self-coincidence is 
doomed to failure on two separate but related counts: 
first, because the structure of the god-project re-
quires that the sought after self-coincidence be at the 
same time a presence to itself—an obvious absurdity— 
and, secondly, because the very nature of being-for-
itself, i.e., as that being whose being is to not-be, 
immediately precludes any self-coincidence. The for-
itself as a flow of freedom is radically different from 
being-in-itself, and their ontological relationship can 
never be other than one of strict separation. 1 4 The 
very attempt to be other than what it is points in it-
self to the true nature of the for-itself, since this 
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project involves "a nihilation of the for-itself, a 
nihilation which does not come to it from without but 
which it has to be." 1* In other words, it is only 
because the for-itself is non-coincidental, i.e., is 
freedom, that it can indulge in its impossible pursuit 
of being. 
It can easily be imagined that the degree of ulti-
mate fulfillment as an existence based upon impure 
reflection's god-project is minimal. To pose as a su-
preme goal an ideal which is not only intrinsically 
self-contradictory, but also destructive of the very 
nature of what it is to be a human, can only result in 
an ever-increasing build-up of frustration and aliena-
tion from both self and others. The god-project's self 
defeating goal poisons human actions and renders them 
ultimately sterile. Personal fulfillment is thwarted 
and attempts at interpersonality mutate into sado-
masochism. As Francis Jeanson says, "insofar as man 
continues to imagine that his mission, however con-
ceived, is inscribed in things, all human activities 
are equivalent and all are doomed to fail." 2' It is 
precisely this inevitable futility of the god-project 
that Sartre has in mind in Being and Nothingness when 
he calls man a "useless passion'**7 and contends that 
"it amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk 
alone or is a leader of nations." 2 2 Reflection is in 
bad faith and forever futile when, rather than accept-
ing its lack of concrete grounding, "it constitutes it-
self as the revelation of the object which 1 make-to-
be-me." 2' And such is exactly impure reflection's 
project. 
Pure Reflection 
We have seen how the for-itself, torn out of its 
immediacy by its confrontation with its own historic-
ity, attempts to recover its being by making itself an 
object through the mediation of impure reflection. We 
have also seen that this attempt to be an interioriza-
tion of being-in-itself and being-for-itself rebounds 
back upon the subject, serving no other purpose than to 
reveal what the for-itself is—namely, that being which 
is and must be noncoincidental. The question before us 
now is this: how can the for-itself reveal to itself 
its inevitable failure to found itself? How is it, in 
other words, that the for-itself is able to make the 
transition from impure to pure reflection? 
Sartre is not entirely comfortable when he discus-
ses reflection's "moment of truth": it would seem that 
the appearance of pure reflection, like that of impure 
reflection, is something of a "mystification." We do 
know, however, that the transition from impure to pure 
reflection must be a deliberate self-purification on 
reflection's part. Reflection itself must somehow be 
the source of its salvation; it must be constitutive of 
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its own metamorphosis, not inhabited and cleansed by an 
external agent. This internal upsurge of reflection 
folding back against itself Sartre calls a "katharsis": 
"Pure reflection can be attained only as the result of 
a modification which it effects on itself and which is 
in the form of a katharsis."" 
Unfortunately, Sartre tells us absolutely nothing 
else about the katharsis, this mysterious internal and 
self-imposed cleansing from whence impure reflection 
magically re-emerges purified. Luckily, however, the 
secondary literature supplements Sartre's rather gratu-
itous statement about reflection's self-purification, 
enabling us to ascertain that this kathartic process 
which impure reflection imposes upon itself is nothing 
else than the for-itselfs performance of a phenorae-
nological reduction upon consciousness." 
Recall that reflection first reveals itself as the 
for-itselfs attempt to recover itself in the midst-of-
the-world. In its campaign to posit itself as an in-
teriorized unity of being-for-itself and being-in-
itself, consciousness ignores the fundamental facts of 
its nonbeing and intentional!ty, and instead projects 
itself as a semi-opaque and impressionable being which 
is molded by the for-itself's being-in-the-world. 
Furthermore, this attitude, which is characteristic of 
impure reflection, examines itself on only a superfi-
cial level. It never attempts to evaluate itself apart 
from its existential modes of self-comprehension—which 
are precisely the products of its behaviour-in-the-
world. It merely "exists" its being. As a result of 
impure reflection's superficiality, consciousness never 
recognises that the fundamental project which it has 
adopted—i.e., the god-project—is incapable of 
realization. It fails to know itself as the lack of 
being which it is and must be. 
The futility and simple wrong-headedness of impure 
reflection can be clearly realized by the for-itself if 
it ever "brackets" consciousness-in-the-worId and exa-
mines, in and of itself, the transcendental nature of 
consciousness. To perform a reduction upon conscious-
ness is to see it stripped of the assumed motives, im-
pulses, structures and other psychic trappings of 
thinghood which consciousness-in-the-world has imposed 
upon it. As Francis Jeanson remarks in Sartre and the 
Problem of Morality, "to understand any psychic 
phenomenon—assuming man faces the world—requires that 
one raise himself from his situation of man-in-the-
world to the origins in consciousness of man in the 
world, and their relation, that is, to a consciousness 
that is transcendental and constitutive. We get at 
this consciousness by means of the 'phenomenological 
reduction'."" 
The phenomenological reduction of consciousness, 
which would appear to be the goal of existential 
psychoanalysis," is a laborious and intensely in-
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trospective separation of consciousness from its objec-
tive situation. It is, in a very literal sense of the 
word, a "retreat," in which reflection undertakes the 
task of disassociating the essential from the nonessen-
tial in its search for self. In cutting itself off 
from the world by means of the reduction so that it 
reveals its essential structure to itself, conscious-
ness arrives at a realization of itself as the being 
whose being is in question. It recognises that it is 
not constituted by but rather is constitutive of 
objects-in-the-world, that it is not a quasi-object 
composed of psychic qualities, and that it is condemned 
to inevitably transcend every attempt at self-coinci-
dence immediately upon its assumption of the effort. 
In a word, consciousness discovers itself as the radi-
cal and uncompromised freedom which it is. Its freedom 
is revealed to it unadorned by involvement in the 
world, and as such appears as the pure nothingness 
which consciousness is, the perpetual overflow of the 
for-itself. To quote Jeanson again, "the freedom ar-
rived at is . . . the essence of freedom: it is pure, 
transcendental consciousness inasmuch as it defines it-
self as freedom."'* 
Pure reflection, in illuminating the structure of 
consciousness by means of the phenomenological reduc-
tion, reveals to itself the futility of the god-project 
and the values to which its pursuit gives rise. The 
clear and distinct realization of itself as freedom, as 
that being which is-not, once and for all dissolves the 
self-deception involved in the quest for being. To 
seek to be what one is not and never can be is not only 
to give rise to fundamental and grave conflicts in 
one's existence pattern; it is also an extremely pig-
headed attitude. As de Beauvoir succinctly tells us, 
"in the face of an obstacle which it is impossible to 
overcome, stubbornness is stupid. If I persist in 
beating my head against a stone wall, my freedom ex-
hausts itself in this useless gesture without succeed-
ing in giving itself a content."" 
Pure reflection, then, assures the for-itself that 
it is fundamentally and inescapably free, and that the 
effort to deny this freedom by means of a frantic pur-
suit of being will never be rewarded with success. It 
forces the for-itself to face the fact that it is a 
transcendental flow, incapable of paying ultimate on-
tological allegiance to either concrete objects or ob-
jectified values. It demonstrates with absolute clari-
ty the futility--indeed, as de Beauvoir says, the stu-
pidity—of continued subservience to the god-project, 
and in so doing purifies reflection of its "existed" 
assumptions about itself. But this moment of lucidity 
which the phenomenological reduction brings to reflec-
tion is not and cannot be the leap into the ethical 
realm. It immediately precedes the subject's assump-
tion of the ethical, but is not in itself representa-
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tive of that qualitative move. The katharsis brought 
about by the reduction is not, in short, conversion. 
It merely disabuses consciousness of its psychic con-
tent, scrubbing the old bottle, as it were, so that the 
new wine may be poured in. 
Conversion and the Recovery of Innocence 
It might seen an obvious conclusion that the pheno-
menological reduction and ethical conversion are one 
and the same phenomenon. Such appears to be de 
Beauvoir 18 opinion; she at least draws a strong analogy 
between the two: "existential conversion should . . . 
be compared to Husserlian reduction: let man put his 
will to be "in parentheses" and he will thereby be 
brought to the consciousness of his true condition." 1* 
Francis Jeanson seems to agree with her: ". . . a t the 
level of pure reflection . . . one has stopped trying 
to give himself motives, drives, supports, or justifi-
cations. Instead, all needs and exigencies are 
referred back to the choice of oneself that constitutes 
one's fundamental project" 1 7—that is, all values are 
chosen in light of the for-itselfs realization of it-
self as radical freedom. And Thomas Anderson's excel-
lent The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics 
likewise makes no distinction between conversion and 
pure reflection. , a While Sartre, cryptic as usual when 
it comes to his ethic, has not explicitly agreed with 
this particular interpretation, neither has he explic-
itly repudiated it. 
I would suggest, however, that the for-itself's 
performance of a phenomenological reduction upon it-
self, and the occurrence of the ethical conversion, are 
two distinct (albeit related) steps towards the moral 
life. The conversion is an outgrowth of, a "part of" 
pure reflection, but the two are not identical. I 
would further contend that, while the conversion is 
dependent upon pure reflection as a necessary condition 
for its appearance, the existence of pure reflection by 
no means entails the emergence of the conversion. 
Thus, not only are conversion and the kathartic reduc-
tion not identical, they are not even inseparable. 
It must be kept in mind that the for-itself's phe-
nomenological reduction of consciousness is a value-
free operation. It is basically a neutral act on 
reflection's part, with no other purpose than to dis-
tinguish between the essential and the nonessential in 
the structure of transcendental consciousness. Its 
only task—and its only goal—is to examine conscious-
ness in itself, and then in turn to examine the con-
sciousness by which consciousness is examined. In do-
ing so, the reduction aims to reveal the nature of what 
truly is as regards the for-itself; it does not aim to 
predicate value judgments concerning the content that 
it uncovers. 
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Translated into specific terms, then, the only 
results of the for-itselfs phenomenological reduction 
upon itself are (1) the revelation that the for-itself 
is essentially that being whose being is in question— 
i.e., whose being is freedom; (2) as a result the in-
itself has no hold on the for-itself. Consciousness is 
not constituted by objects, but is rather itself con-
stitutive of them. The case is likewise with values; 
there is no necessity binding the for-itself to its 
valuation of being save its own free choice. It does 
not receive the notion of value from external ideals; 
it creates those ideals for itself. (3) Consequently, 
the attempt to deny the non-being which the for-itself 
must be—i.e., to blindly pursue the god-project—is, 
in de Beauvoir's terms, "stupid." 
Notice that the results of the reduction are en-
tirely neutral in tone. They convey information only, 
not value judgments. The most partisan thing the 
reduction does is to point out the foolhardiness of 
pursuing an impossible quest—foolhardy from an intel-
lectual or logical, and not a moral point of view. The 
pursuit of the god-project, the reduction discloses, is 
foolish in the same way that an obsessive effort to 
square a circle is foolish. 
In short, the phenomenological reduction, by illu-
minating the essential structure of the for-itself, 
reveals the futility of the god-project. It does not, 
however, represent the abandonment of the project. 
That act of the will, clearly not a part of the dispas-
sionately neutral reduction's mandate, just as clearly 
belongs to the domain of the radical conversion. 
The conversion, it seems to me, can only be under-
stood as a direct volitional act of the for-itself 
arising from reflection upon the reduction's revelation 
of the for-itself's true nature. The volitional act 
consists of the for-itself's explicit acceptance of the 
responsibility which its constitutive nature entails— 
i.e., the affirmation that in a world devoid of intrin-
sic values it (the for-itself) is bound by no normative 
constraints other than those which it freely chooses--
and the concomitant acknowledgment that freedom, inas-
much as it represents the condition for the possibility 
of valuation in general (i.e., choice) is itself the 
ultimate foundation of values. As such, conversion is 
a radical abandonment of the self-defeating and 
interpersonal-alienating god-project. It is an assump-
tion of the ethical in that it places full responsibil-
ity upon the individual for-itself, a responsibility 
which is precisely freedom's correlate. The radical 
nonbeing of the for-itself, its incapacity to achieve 
self-coincidence—in short, its freedom--is now af-
firmed rather than fled from. The for-itself freely 
accepts its intentional, constitutive nature, freely 
acknowledges that it, as sole author of its acts and 
values, bears sole responsibility for them. As Sartre 
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tells us, the ethical man "carries the weight of the 
whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the 
world and for himself as a way of being. We are taking 
the word 'responsibility' in the usual sense as 
'consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of 
an event or object'. In this sense the responsibility 
of the for-itself is overwhelming since he is the one 
by whom it happens that there is a world." 1' This ex-
plicit acceptance of its non-being does not mean that 
the for-itself suppresses its desire to be god; that 
hunger is a result of its ontological structure. It 
does mean, however, that the for-itself is no longer a 
slave to that desire, that its fundamental project is 
no longer the god-project, but is instead freedom 
itself.*' 
The ethical conversion, then, is a volitional com-
mitment on the part of the individual for-itself that 
replaces god-desire as fundamental project with freedom 
as fundamental project. It is not identical to the 
phenomenological reduction, but does rely upon it as a 
necessary condition for its appearance. 
A further indication that the reduction and the 
radical conversion are not identical is that the two do 
not have to appear together. There seems to be nothing 
in pure reflection that necessitates the upsurge of the 
conversion. It is at least imaginable that the for-
itself could react in a number of non-conversion ways 
to the revelation of self which the reduction supplies. 
The for-itself could conceivably flee with the utmost 
alacrity from the picture of freedom which the reduc-
tion has provided, embracing more violently than ever 
the god-project which it so "foolishly" left for a 
short time. Or, again, it is conceivable that the for-
itself, faced with the realization that its fond hopes 
in regards to the god-project are illusions, might en-
close itself within an impenetrable shell of cynicism 
or even nihilism. In short, there is no necessary con-
nection between reduction and conversion. The former 
merely illuminates and the latter results only from a 
deliberately volitional acceptance of the implications 
of the freedom thus illuminated. In short, kathartic 
reduction can lead the for-itself to an awareness of 
its freedom, but it can't make it convert. 
As a final word on the nonidentity of the kathartic 
reduction and the radical conversion, I would point to 
a highly suggestive paragraph towards the end of 
Sartre's essay "Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of 
Self." Although, as indicated earlier, Sartre has 
never addressed himself specifically to the issue at 
hand, his remarks in this essay concerning the moral 
realm seem to indicate that he is aware of the voli-
tional basis of an existentialist ethic—a basis which, 
I have argued, cannot arise from the ethically neutral 
reduction. In the passage in question, Sartre says 
that we "place ourselves . . . on the level of moral-
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ity . . . starting from the moment when we reject be-
ing, since being has rejected us, the moment when we no 
longer want values, in the sense in which want is taken 
as a simple coincidence with self."* 1 Note that he 
uses verbs such as 'reject' and 'want' which clearly 
indicate volition. The level of morality is attained 
not when the for-itself passively becomes aware of the 
futility of the god-project, but rather when it delib-
erately "rejects being"; the conversion is enacted not 
when the for-itself realises that basing its existence 
on the value of being is foolish, but when it actively 
rejects that value, when it ceases to "want" it. And, 
indeed, the act of choice called for by radical conver-
sion would seem to be consistent with the voluntaristic 
nature of existentialist ethics in general.** 
There remains one final aspect of the dynamics of 
Sartrean conversion to examine, and that is the for-
itself' s "recovery of innocence" which I alluded to 
earlier in this discussion. I maintain that the for-
itself s attainment of the ethical conversion repre-
sents a fundamental change in project and behaviour in 
which freedom (to extend the "conversion" metaphor) 
washes away the for-itselfs "sinful" obsession with 
the god-project. This notion of the for-itself's 
return to an original innocence after conversion high-
lights the "worldly temptation" of being which over-
takes the for-itself in the course of its development. 
As usual, Sartre does not explicitly discuss this 
recovery of innocence, but he does refer to it in a 
passage that at first glance seems to be a typically 
Sartrean barbarism. He says: ". . . reflection can be 
either pure or impure. Pure reflection, the simple 
presence of the reflective for-itself to the for-itself 
reflected on, is at once the original form of reflec-
tion and its ideal form; it is that on whose foundation 
impure reflection appears, it is that which is never 
first given |butj which must be won by a sort of 
katharsis . . . ."*1 
This is indeed a paradoxical statement. In one and 
the same sentence, Sartre tells us that pure reflection 
is both the original and the terminal ("ideal") form of 
reflection, and that it is both given (as the founda-
tion upon which impure reflection appears) and yet not 
given, but rather won ("by a sort of katharsis")! What 
are we to make of this rather bizzare locution? 
The paradoxes contained within this quotation seem 
to resolve themselves if we interpret them as being ex-
pressive of the for-itselfs recovery of innocence. 
The dynamics of this recovery might be described as 
follows. The for-itselfs attitude, it will be remem-
bered, was immediacy, a direct and spontaneously lived 
relationship with the world. To be sure, immediate 
consciousness is nonreflective (although it is nonthe-
tically aware of the cogito), but it is consequently 
also unsullied by the psychic cirrosis which it ac-
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quires as the result of impure reflection's being-in-
the-world. It is a simple flow of intentionality, un-
mediated by conceptual assumptions about the value of 
non-value of being, and as such is not bound to a fun-
damental desire to be god. Its being-in-the-world, 
while not a deliberate (i.e., reflective) effort to ex-
ist as a freedom, is nevertheless a natural flow of 
freedom. It represents an "existed" celebration of the 
freedom which the for-itself is, unhampered in its flow 
because, unlike reflection, it has not tried to objec-
tify itself. 
Immediacy, then, is really the original form of 
pure reflection's post-conversion attitude, the ideal 
terminus of a Sartrean ethic. It is, in a natural, 
naive, unreflective—"innocent"—way, that which the 
ethical for-itself must continually and reflectively 
strive to be—namely, a flow of freedom, unsullied by 
ulterior motives, simply "existed" for its own sake. 
This pure reflection is both the "original" and the 
"ideal" form of reflection. 
We also saw that immediacy, this pure flow of 
freedom on the for-itselfs part, is unable to sustain 
itself in the midst of the world, that its confronta-
tion with being throws it into the realm of impure re-
flection and the god-project. In impure reflection the 
for-itself*s actions are no longer unmediated; they no 
longer represent the flow of freedom for the sake of 
itself. Quite the contrary. The for-itself now seeks 
to deny that very freedom which it previously cele-
brated by encapsulating itself and its values within 
the domain of the in-itself. Its naive, natural fide-
lity to what it is has given way to a sophisticated 
distortion, and the results, as we saw, are destructive 
to the development of both the individual for-itself 
and interpersonal relations. It is only through an in-
tense effort at self-illumination (the phenomenological 
reduction) and an act of volition which "wins" for the 
subject its freedom from the psychic structure, that 
pure reflection is recovered. This pure reflection is 
both given and not given. It appears as the natural 
attitude of the for-itself, is subsequently blemished 
by the for-itself's reflective attempts at self-
coincidence, and, if it is to be recovered, must 
finally be won by a deliberately volitional act. 
The ethical conversion's abandonment of the god-
project and affirmation of freedom as primary value, 
then, represents a return of sorts to the original, 
pre-reflective celebration of freedom which was charac-
teristic of original immediacy. It is in this sense 
that we may call it a recovery of innocence. It is 
not, however, a literal return to original immediacy on 
the for-itselfs part; normal consciousness cannot 
sustain itself in a state of immediacy except in the 
elusive present. Rather, the untrammeled flow of 
freedom which immediacy naturally was is qualitatively 
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re-affirmed on a reflective basis by pure reflection. 
The fundamental project which immediacy nonreflectively 
sprang from—i.e., the estimation of freedom as the 
logical source of all values—is deliberately chosen in 
the conversion. The flow of freedom is no longer 
naive; it is informed by both an awareness of the 
futility of the god-project and a simultaneous longing 
for it, and as such must constantly be on guard against 
succumbing to it. The pure reflection of conversion, 
in its return to a kind of immediacy, is thus an incor-
poration and a surpassing of both original immediacy 
and impure reflection. It is an innocence, if you 
will, tempered by a knowledge of the possibility of 
guilt.** 
Ill 
In the course of this discussion, I have been 
concerned to schematize the necessary conditions for 
the possibility of a Sartrean ethic. That schematiza-
tion, to recapitulate, is as follows: the dynamics of 
radical conversion involves a process of the coming-to-
be of self-realization on the part of being-for-itself, 
a discovery of self which is initiated when the origi-
nal freedom of immediacy is shattered by the for-
itself s lived dispersion in the world. In its attempt 
to recover itself, the for-itself enters into a mode of 
reflection which becomes habitual and which can eventu-
ally grow to be insurmountable. That mode is, of 
course, impure reflection, which has as its raison 
d'etre the quest for being, the desire to be god. 
Impure reflection will continue to shape the individual 
for-itselfs existence until the for-itself enters into 
intensive self-examination and performs what is in ef-
fect a phenomenological reduction upon itself. The 
reduction, which clearly reveals the transcendental 
structure of consciousness to the for-itself, will ef-
fectively dissolve the hopeful illusions which the for-
itself entertains in regards to the god-project. The 
for-itself must then "choose," in a deliberate, voli-
tional act, whether it will freely accept the nature 
revealed by the reduction, or whether it will flee from 
it in panic. If the former alternative is affirmed, 
the for-itself is propelled (or, better, propels it-
self) into the ethical. In choosing to reject the god-
project, and to exist as a deliberate flow of freedom, 
the for-itself recovers the innocence which it enjoyed 
in its original state of immediacy—an innocence all 
the more meaningful, perhaps, for its having been won 
rather than simply given. Insofar as the dynamics of 
Sartrean conversion is concerned, my beginning, to 
paraphrase T. S. Eliot, is indeed my end, and my end my 
beginning.* 8 
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NOTES 
'It 1B highly probable, however, that surviving 
fragments of the ethical manuscripts will be published 
posthumously. In 1973 Michel Contat was named executor 
and overseer of the posthumous publication of all of 
Sartre's unfinished texts. These include the ethical 
treatise L'Homme, two chapters of the second volume of 
the Critique, and the beginning of the last volume of 
L'Idiot de la fami l ie. See Axel Madsen's Hearts and 
Minds: The Common Journey of Simone de Beauvoir and 
Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Morrow Quelle, Publishers, 
1977), p. 287. 
'As Sartre says in Sartre par lui-meme (Paris: 
Editions Gallimard, 1977) (not to be confused with the 
book by the same title written by Francis Jeanson and 
included in Gallimard's "Par lui-meme" series); Sartre 
by Himself, A Film, translated by Richard Seaver (New 
York: Urizen Books, 1978), p. 81: "I have, when you 
think about it, written two 'Ethics': the first 
between 1945-46, completely mystified—the 'Ethics' I 
thought I could write after I had finished Being and 
Nothingness. The notes I had on that first version 
I've relegated to the bottom drawer. And then notes 
that date from 1965 or thereabouts, on another 
'Ethics,' which related to the problem of realism as 
well as that of morality. I could have written a book 
using those notes as a basis, but I just haven't done 
it as yet." 
'See, for instance, Maurice Cranston's The Quintes-
sence of Sartrism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969), 
p. 3: "Sartre can be fairly called a puritan, because 
of |his] austerity and high moral seriousness; and also 
because his work has always been informed by a profound 
distaste for the visible world of corruption and 
folly." Or Francis Jeanson's Le Prob1erne moral et la 
pensee de Sartre (Paris: Editions 3u Seuil, i955"5T 
Sartre and" the Problem of Morality, translated by 
Robert V. Stone (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1980), p. 265: "I maintained eighteen years 
ago, and I continue to maintain today, that Sartre's 
philosophy is a moral philosophy and all its virtue for 
us issues from this." And finally Simone de Beauvoir's 
Pour une morale de 1'ambiguite (Paris: Librarie 
Gallimard, 1946); fKe Ethics 0? Ambiguity, translated 
by Bernard Frechtman (Secaucus, New Jersey: The 
Citadel Press, 1975), p. 34: Sartrean "existentialism 
alone gives—like religions—a real role to evil, and 
it is this, perhaps, which makes its judgments so 
gloomy." 
'Namely, Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of 
Ambiguity and Pyrrhus et Cineas (Paris: Librarie 
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Gallimard, 1944); Andre Gorz, Fondements pour une 
morale (Paris: Galilee, 1977); and Francis Jeanson, 
Sartre and the Problem of Morality. 
"Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Etre et le neant (Paris: 
Librarie Gallimard, 1943, pp. 431^83. Hereafter re-
ferred to as EN; Being and Nothingness, translated by 
Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 
1975), pp. 474-533. Hereafter referred to as BN. 
'EN, pp. 484, 670, 722; BN, pp. 534, 742, 798. 
7Simone de Beauvoir (Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 11) 
echoes the notion that BN is by and large a study of 
bad faith: ". . . i n Being and Nothingness Sartre has 
insisted above all on the abortive aspect of the human 
adventure. It is only in the last pages that he opens 
up a perspective for an ethics." 
'What I call 'immediacy' in this paper Sartre 
usually refers to as 'unreflective consciousness' or 
'nonreflection'. I use 'immediacy' here because (1) it 
seems to me to better capture Sartre's meaning in the 
context of the present discussion than does his term; 
and (2) it is less awkward from a stylistic point of 
view. 
'EN, pp. 16-22; BN, pp. 9-16. 
" I am referring, of course, to Sartre's well known 
example of counting cigarettes (EN, p. 19; BN, p. 13). 
In summary, he tells us that an individual can be en-
gaged in so mindless a task as counting one's ciga-
rettes and still be (nonthetically) aware of the 
cogito. This awareness is demonstrated by the 
counter's immediate, nonpremediated response "I am 
counting cigarettes" when asked by a second party to 
give an account of her present act. The pre-reflective 
knowledge of the cogito thus reveals itself in our or-
dinary speech patterns. 
1 1Jean-Paul Sartre, "Conscience de soi et connais-
sance de soi," Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de 
Philosophie 42 (1948), pp. 49-91; "Consciousness of 
Self and Knowledge of Self," translated by Mary Ellen 
and N. Lawrence in Readings in Existential Phenomeno-
logy, edited by N. Lawrence and D. O'Connor (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 142. 
"Sartre, "Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of 
Self," p. 142. 
"EN, p. 205; BN, p. 222. 
"EN, p. 199; BN, p. 215. 
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"EN, p. 200; BN, p. 216. 
"EN, pp. 206 ff.; BN, pp. 221 ff. 
"EN, p. 215; BN, p. 234. 
"EN, p. 200; BN, p. 216. 
"See, for instance, EN, p. 708; BN, p. 784, where 
Sartre, in speaking of the for-itself*s attempt to be a 
synthesis of being-in-and-for-itself, says "every human 
reality [in this mode) is a passion in that it projects 
losing itself so as to found being and by the same 
stroke to constitute the in-itself which escapes cont-
ingency by being its own foundation, the Ens causa sui, 
which religions call God." See also EN, p. 718; BN, p. 
792. 
"EN, p. 200; BN, p. 216. 
"EN, p. 208; BN, p. 226. 
"Sartre's notion that impure reflection sees con-
sciousness as a plastic tabula rasa constituted by the 
objects in the world which it encounters can be traced 
in his writings at least as far back as Esquisse d'une 
theorie des emotions (Paris: Hermann, 1939); The 
Emotions: Outline of a Theory, translated by Bernard 
Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948). In 
speaking of emotions, for instance, he tells us that 
impure reflection sees the emotion it experiences as 
somehow imposed upon it: "Ordinarily, we direct upon 
the emotive consciousness an accessory reflection which 
certainly perceives consciousness as consciousness, but 
insofar as it is motivated by the project: 'I am angry 
because it is hateful'. It is on the basis of this re-
flection that the passion will constitute itself." 
Even in this early work, however, Sartre sees that 
there is an alternative to impure (or "accessory") re-
flection, for he goes on to say that "the purifying re-
flection of the phenomenological reduction can perceive 
the emotion insofar as it constitutes the world in a 
magical form. 'I find it hateful because I am angry.'" 
(Esquisse, p. 49; Emotions, p. 91) 
"See EN, pp. 85-114; BN, pp. 86-118; and de 
Beauvoir's Ethics of Ambiguity, pp. 36-73. 
"•Until, of course, the death of the individual 
for-itself. But even then the relationship is really 
one between two differentiations of being-in-itself, 
rather than between being-in-itself and being-for-
itself. 
"EN, p. 199; BN, p. 215. 
375 
"Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, p. 
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J 7EN, p. 708; BN, p. 784. 
"EN, pp. 721-722; BN, p. 797. 
"EN, p. 208; BN, p. 226. 
"EN, p. 206; BN, p. 224. 
"See de Beauvoir's Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 14; 
Jeanson's Sartre and the Problem of Morality, pp. 34, 
72, 83-89, 183; and an excellent short article by 
Thomas Busch, "Sartre: The Phenomenological Reduction 
and Human Relations," Journal of the British Society 
for Phenomenology 6, (January 1975). 
"Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, p. 
34. 
"See, for instance, EN, pp. 720-721; EN, p. 796: 
"existential psychoanalysis is moral description, for 
it releases to us the ethical meaning of various human 
projects . . . the principle result of existential psy-
choanalysis must be to make us repudiate the spirit of 
seriousness." 
"Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, p. 
72. 
" d e Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 28. 
" d e Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 14. 
"Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, p. 
28. 
"Thomas C. Anderson, The Foundation and Structure 
of a Sartrean Ethics (Lawrence, Kansas: The Regents 
Press of Kansas, 1979). Anderson says, for instance 
(p. 41): "Morality ideally is a reflective study of 
values operating with full awareness that man is their 
source (this full awareness Sartre calls purifying 
reflection)." 
"EN, p. 638; BN, p. 707. 
*°See, for instance, de Beauvoir's Ethics of 
Ambiguity, p. 14: "existentialist conversion does not 
suppress my instincts, desires, plans, and passions. 
It merely prevents any possibility of failure by refus-
ing to set up as absolutes the ends toward which my 
transcendence thrusts itself, and by considering them 
207. 
in their connection with the freedom which projects 
them." 
*'Sartre, "Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of 
Self," p. 134. Emphasis mine. 
"For an excellent discussion of the voluntaristic 
nature of existential ethics, see the first four chap-
ters of Frederick Olafson's Principles and Persons 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). 
*'EN, p. 201; BN, 218. 
"Although it is beyond the scope of this particu-
lar discussion to go into the matter in detail, I can't 
resist the temptation of suggesting that the radical 
conversion'8 pure flow of freedom is an excellent can-/ 
didate for Sartre's spirit of "play." The tantalising 
reference to play at the end of Being and Nothingness 
(EN, pp. 669-670; BN, pp. 741-742) has been all but ig-
nored by most commentators, but its claim that play 
"releases subjectivity," and is the avenue through 
which man "escapes his natural nature Qmpure reflec-
tion] so that he apprehends himself as free and wishes 
to use his freedom," is remarkably similar to my 
description of the effect of the radical conversion. 
It's certain that more work needs to be done on the 
nature of Sartrean play, and I hope to contribute to 
that enterprise in the future. At the present time, to 
the best of my knowledge, there are only two articles 
that explicitly concern themselves with the topic: 
Thomas Busch's "Sartre: The Phenomenological Reduction 
and Human Relationships," and Ralph Netzky's "Playful 
Freedom: Sartre's Ontology Re-appraised," Philosophy 
Today 18 (Summer 1974). Both studies are, unfortu-
nately, limited. Busch fails to make the important 
distinction between the reduction and the conversion 
(which I have discussed in this paper), and Netzky 
misses the point of the reduction altogether. 
''Completion of this work was made possible through 
the support of a University of Cincinnati Summer 
Research Grant (1983). I'd like to thank Robert 
Richardson, Richard Toenjes and Auslegung's three ano-
nymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. Weaknesses which may remain 
are, of course, my responsibility. 
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